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The UPC Addresses the Class-Gift and
Intestacy Rights of Children of
Assisted Reproduction Technologies
by Sheldon F Kurtz, Iowa City, Iowa, and
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Ann Arbor, Michigan*
Editor's Synopsis: Recent years' advances in
assisted reproduction technology have enabled the con-
ception of children in ways in addition to the traditional
way. The Uniform Probate Code was amended last
year to address the status of children born from assisted
reproductive technologies for intestacy and class-gift
purposes. This article discusses the relevant UPC pro-
visions and offers several hypothetical cases to show
how they operate. The article concludes expressing the
hope that states will consider the new UPC approach.
Introduction
Class-gift and intestacy rights of children of assist-
ed reproduction pose relatively new and complex ques-
tions in the law. These questions are destined to
become increasingly important as the use of assisted
reproduction technologies increases. The judges in sev-
eral recent decisions have implored their state legisla-
tures to address the inheritance rights of children of
assisted reproduction.' In Woodward v. Commissioner
of Social Security,2 Chief Justice Marshall of the Mass-
achusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: "The ques-
tions present in this case cry out for lengthy, careful
examination outside the adversary process, which can
only address the specific circumstances of each contro-
versy that presents itself. They demand a comprehen-
sive response reflecting the considered will of the peo-
ple."' Chief Justice Marshall's statement was quoted
with approval in the New Hampshire case of Khabbaz v.
Commissioner, Social Security Administration.4 Con-
curring separately, Chief Justice Broderick stated: "I
write separately to respectfully urge the legislature to
examine, within the context of the state's intestacy
statute, the confluence of new, ever-expanding birth
technologies and the seemingly arcane language and
presumptions attendant to the settlement of decedents'
estates. I believe that with time and further technologi-
cal advances, this confluence will engulf more and
more of our state's families and the children produced
as a consequence of such advances."' In the New York
case of In re Martin B.,6 Surrogate Renee Roth stated:
"As can be seen from all of the above, there is a need for
comprehensive legislation to resolve the issues raised
by advances in biotechnology."' Similarly, in Finley v.
Astrue, Justice Danielson of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas stated: "[W]e strongly encourage the General
Assembly to revisit the intestacy succession statutes to
address the issues involved in the instant case and those
that have not but will likely evolve."9
As amended by the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) this past summer, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC
or Code) now addresses the status of children of assisted
reproduction for purposes of intestacy and class gifts. 0
* Copyright 2009 by Sheldon F. Kurtz and Lawrence W.
Waggoner. All rights reserved.
' Judges in non-inheritance contexts have expressed the same
view. In a child custody case, for example, Justice Dooley of the
Supreme Court of Vermont stated: "[W]e face the problem here of
a family created by artificial insemination, and the Legislature has
not dealt directly with new reproductive technologies.... We
express, as many other courts have, a preference for legislative
action.... Again, we stress that the difficulty in interpretation in this
context arises because the Legislature has not addressed assisted
reproductive technologies." Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912
A.2d 951, 968-70 (Vt. 2006).
2 Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d
257 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 272.
Khabbaz v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration,
930 A.2d 1180, 1186 (N.H. 2007).
I Id. at 1187.
6 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Surr. Ct. 2007).
* Id. at 212.
Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008).
9 Id. at 855.
1o The Uniform Parentage Act (2000, amended 2002) (UPA)
also addresses children of assisted reproduction. Although the
main focus of the UPA is on non-inheritance issues, UPA § 707
addresses the parental status of a decedent in a manner that in some
respects is inconsistent with the UPC. UPA § 203, however, pro-
vides that a parent-child relationship established under the UPA
does not apply if contradicted by another law of the jurisdiction.
The Comment to UPA § 203 specifically mentions the UPC as
another law. Consequently, if any state enacts both statutes, the
UPC would take precedence to the extent that the two are in con-
flict regarding intestacy and class gifts.
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The ULC took this step on the recommendation of the
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts"
and a Special Drafting Committee to Amend the UPC.12
As amended, the UPC is now closely aligned with the new
Restatement of Property on these issues." The new UPC
provisions constitute a self-contained set of provisions that
can be enacted separately and not only as part of the UPC
as a whole.
Assisted reproduction is defined in the Code as any
method of causing pregnancy other than sexual inter-
course. 4 These methods currently include intrauterine
insemination (previously and sometimes currently
called artificial insemination), donation of eggs, dona-
tion of embryos, in-vitro fertilization and transfer of
embryos, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
The woman who becomes pregnant by one of these
technologies may do so because she intends to be the
child's mother. If she intends to be the child's mother,
she may be married to a man or a woman (under the
law of Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, or Vermont), or she may be in a civil union
or domestic partnership with another woman (under
the law of California, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey,
Oregon, Washington, or the District of Columbia), or
she may be unmarried with or without a partner of the
same or opposite sex. Alternatively, the woman who
becomes pregnant may be a surrogate who has agreed
to bear the child for a married or unmarried couple of
the same or opposite sex or for an unpartnered man or
woman.'6 To further complicate matters, the sperm that
fertilizes the egg may be the sperm of a man who
intends to be the child's father or the sperm of a third-
party donor who has no such intention and probably
was compensated for making the donation. The egg
that is fertilized may be the egg of a woman who
intends to be the child's mother or the egg of a third-
party donor who has no such intention and probably
was compensated for making the donation. The possi-
ble combinations are legion.
Class Gifts: UPC § 2-705
For ACTEC Fellows, the most important aspect of
the new biology is how children of assisted reproduc-
tion are treated for class-gift purposes. Are such chil-
dren included as class members in the case, for exam-
ple, of an income or a remainder interest to a trust
beneficiary's "children" or "descendants," and, if so,
under what circumstances are they included? A relat-
ed question is how such children are treated for pur-
poses of intestacy. Although ACTEC Fellows do not
often deal directly with intestate estates, the treatment
of children of assisted reproduction under the intesta-
cy laws is a matter of social importance and, under the
UPC, governs how such children are treated for pur-
poses of a class gift. UPC § 2-705 provides that a class
gift that uses a term of relationship to identify the class
members includes a child of assisted reproduction and
his or her respective descendants, if appropriate to the
class, in accordance with the rules for intestate succes-
sion regarding parent-child relationships.
It bears emphasizing that UPC § 2-705 establishes
a rule of construction regarding class gifts, not a
mandatory rule. 7 A rule of construction is a default
rule that applies in the absence of a contrary inten-
tion." Consequently, drafting attorneys have every
opportunity to alter a rule of construction in order to
give effect to a client's individual preferences. 9
" In addition to the authors, ACTEC Fellows on the Joint Edi-
torial Board are Jackson Bruce, David English, Mary Louise Fel-
lows, Thomas Gallanis, Edward Halbach, Susan House, Joseph
Kartiganer, John Langbein, Carlyn McCaffrey, Judith McCue,
Malcolm Moore, Bruce Stone, and Raymond Young.
2 In addition to the authors, ACTEC Fellows on the Special
Drafting Committee are Turney Berry and David English.
'1 Officially, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS. On the RESTATEMENT'S treat-
ment of class gifts, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts under
the Restatement (Third) of Property, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 993
(2007).
1 See UPC § 2-115(2).
* For a listing of such states, see www.ncsl.org/programs/
cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Jun. 16, 2009).
16 Interestingly, both the New York Times Sunday Magazine
and Newsweek have recently featured front cover articles on surro-
gacy. See Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30Surrogate.html?_r- 1 &scp=
1 &sq=her%20body,%20my%20baby&st=cse (last visited Nov. 30,
2008); Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surro-
gates, NEWSWEEK, April 7, 2008, at 45.
* See UPC § 2-701.
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OrHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 (2003).
* Technically, and unfortunately, a posthumously conceived
child born to a decedent's surviving widow could be considered a
nonmarital child. See, e.g., Woodward v. Commissioner of Social
Security, supra note 2, at 266-67 ("Because death ends a marriage,
... posthumously conceived children are always nonmarital chil-
dren."). Nevertheless, a provision in a will, trust, or other govern-
ing instrument that relates to the inclusion or exclusion of a non-
marital child, or to the inclusion or exclusion of a nonmarital child
under specific circumstances, would not have been inserted with a
child of assisted reproduction in mind. Consequently, such a pro-
vision ought to be treated as inapplicable to a child of assisted
reproduction. When published in hard-bound volume, the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 14.8 cmt. m will so provide.
To remove any doubt about the matter under the UPC, an amend-
ment to § 2-705 saying so explicitly may be forthcoming.
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Intestacy: UPC §§ 2-120 and 2-121
The Code deals with intestacy rights, and by incor-
poration, class-gift rights, in two sections. Section 2-
120 deals with children of assisted reproduction where
the birth mother is not a surrogate. Section 2-121 deals
with such children where the woman who became preg-
nant by assisted reproduction is a surrogate. 0
The UPC uses the term "parent-child relationship"
to indicate the existence of intestacy rights. If either
§ 2-120 or § 2-121 provides that a parent-child rela-
tionship exists or is established, the effect is that the
parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of
the parent for purposes of intestate succession and
class gifts.21 The Code does not require the parent to
adopt the child in order for a parent-child relationship
to be recognized under these sections.
Non-Surrogacy
Non-Surrogacy Birth Mother Automatically Has
Parent-Child Relationship With Child ofAssisted
Reproduction
In the non-surrogacy situation, the birth mother is
a woman who has voluntarily become pregnant by
means of assisted reproduction technology. It there-
fore seems appropriate to conclude that her purpose
was to have her child, and the Code does so. Regard-
less of whether she is the child's genetic mother (i.e.,
whether or not the egg that was fertilized was her egg
or the egg of a third-party donor), her action in under-
going the procedure automatically establishes a par-
ent-child relationship between her and the child.22
Consequently, in the case of an intestacy, the child
inherits from or through the birth mother and the birth
mother inherits from or through the child. If the birth
mother or someone else creates a will, trust, or other
I The Code uses the term "gestational carrier" for a surrogate
and uses the term "gestational child" for a child born to a surrogate.
See UPC § 2-121(a).
21 See UPC § 2-116.
2 See UPC § 2-120(c). This position is consistent with
§ 201(a) of the Uniform Parentage Act (2002). If, subsequent to
the child's birth, the birth mother gives the child up for adoption
and the child is adopted, a parent-child relationship is established
between the child and the child's adoptive parent or parents (see
UPC § 2-118(a)) and the parent-child relationship with the birth
mother is usually severed (see UPC §§ 2-119(a); -119(e)).
' See UPC § 2-120(b).
24 See UPC § 2-120(a)(3).
' Even so, there are two exceptions to the establishment of a
parent-child relationship: if, before insemination, (1) Rick and
arrangement that contains a class gift in favor of the
birth mother's "children" or "descendants," the child is
presumptively a class member.
The question in the non-surrogacy cases is whether
someone else also has a parent-child relationship with
the resulting child. Under the Code, a third-party
donor never has such a relationship.23 A third-party
donor is someone who, for compensation or not, pro-
vides sperm or eggs for assisted reproduction. Not
counted as a third-party donor, however, is (1) a spouse
whose sperm or egg is used for assisted reproduction
by the wife; (2) the birth mother; (3) an individual who
is identified on the child's birth certificate as the other
parent of the child; or (4) an individual who consented
to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent
to be treated as the child's other parent.
Rick and Donna, Husband and Wife
Consider the case of Rick and Donna, a husband
and wife in their late thirties who want children or
another child but have had difficulty conceiving by sex-
ual intercourse. Before taking the step of adopting a
child, they try to conceive by artificial insemination (or
some other procedure), using Rick's sperm for that pur-
pose. The procedure is successful. Donna becomes
pregnant and gives birth to a child who grows up with
the couple in the same household. In such a case, Rick
and Donna are the genetic parents of the child,25 and
Rick undoubtedly would be identified as the father on
the child's birth certificate.26 Under the Code, Rick is
the child's father, i.e., he has a parent-child relationship
with the child.27 In many such cases, the child will
never be told and will never have reason to question
how he or she was conceived. In any event, in the case
of an intestacy, the child inherits from or through Rick
as well as from and through Donna (the birth mother)
and Rick as well as Donna inherits from or through the
Donna were divorced; or (2) Rick, in a record, withdrew consent to
the use of his sperm for that purpose. See UPC § 2-120(i), (j).
26 Under UPC § 2-120(e), the father's name on the birth cer-
tificate presumptively establishes a parent-child relationship
between him and the child. Generally, state law controls whose
name can be inserted on a birth certificate as the child's father. It is
common for such laws to provide that the child's father is the
mother's husband absent a paternity order showing another to be
the father. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.013(2)(a); IOWA CODE
§ 144.13((2); MicH. COMP. L. ANN. § 333.2824(1), (6). States
usually have procedures whereby the named father can set aside a
presumption of paternity arising by his name being listed on the
birth certificate. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(b).
2 See UPC § 2-120(d).
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child. If Rick or someone else creates a will, trust, or
other arrangement that contains a class gift in favor of
Rick's "children" or "descendants," the child is pre-
sumptively a class member.
Suppose that Donna's assisted-reproduction preg-
nancy came about using the sperm of a third-party
donor or, alternatively, using the egg of a third-party
donor, or using the sperm and egg of third-party
donors. As the birth mother, Donna has a parent-child
relationship with the child. Rick also has a parent-
child relationship with the child if Rick's name
appears on the birth certificate as the child's father" or,
absent that, if he consented to the procedure with the
intent to be treated as the child's other parent.2 9 Ideal-
ly, Rick's consent to be treated as the child's other par-
ent will be evidenced by a writing or other record."o In
the absence of such a record, his consent can be evi-
denced by his behavior toward the child, i.e., that he
functioned as the child's parent' within two years of
the child's birth or intended to function as the parent
but was prevented from doing so by death, incapacity,
or other circumstances.32 Because Rick and Donna
were married, the Code creates a strong but rebuttable
presumption that he satisfied one or the other of the
preceding requirements."
Sam and Mary, Unmarried Partners
Suppose that Sam and Mary are unmarried part-
ners. If Mary has a child as a result of an assisted
reproduction technology, she has a parent-child rela-
tionship with the child because she is the birth mother.
Since she and Sam are not married, Sam is not pre-
sumed to be the child's other parent, even if his sperm
was used to create the child. His parentage, however,
could be established if he consented to have his name
listed on the child's birth certificate.Y Absent that, he
would also have a parent-child relationship with the
child if he "consented to assisted reproduction by the
birth mother with intent to be treated as the other par-
ent of the child."35
Ann and Sara, Unmarried Partners
Suppose that Ann and Sara are unmarried part-
ners. If Sara has a child by an assisted reproductive
technology, she is the birth mother and has a par-
ent-child relationship with the child. It would also
be possible for Ann to have a parent-child relation-
ship with the child. If Ann is not listed as the other
parent on the child's birth certificate, the parent-
2 See supra note 26.
29 See UPC § 2-120(f). Under Michigan law, a "child con-
ceived by a married woman with consent of her husband following
the utilization of assisted reproductive technology is considered to
be the legitimate child of the husband and wife." MICH. COMP. L.
ANN. § 333.2824(6).
30 UPC § 2-120(f)(1) provides that consent with intent to be
treated as the other parent of the child can be established by a
signed record that, "considering all the facts and circumstances,
evidences the individual's intent." The statute is phrased this way
because fertility clinic consent forms typically do not directly state
that the individual giving consent does so with intent to be treated
as the child's parent. For example, the University of Michigan
Center for Reproductive Medicine's consent form relative to in-
vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos states that "the control
and direction for the disposition of these zygotes/embryos rests
with [insert name of spouse or partner] and [insert name of other
spouse or partner] for transfer into the woman's uterus in one or
more future cycles for the purpose of establishing a normal preg-
nancy." The form further provides: "In the event of the death of
one partner, the control and direction of the disposition of tissues
will remain with the surviving partner noted in this contract."
(Copy of consent form on file with the authors.) Considering all
the facts and circumstances, this form (and others like it) evidences
the intent to be treated as the other parent of any resulting child.
Accord, In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Surr. Ct. 2007), where
the court held that a similar consent form satisfied the intent
requirement.
By Legislative Note, the UPC encourages enacting states to
require genetic depositories to provide a consent form that would
directly state that the individual giving consent does so with intent
to be treated as the child's parent.
" The phrase "functioned as a parent of the child" means
"behaving toward a child in a manner consistent with being the
child's parent and performing the functions that are customarily
performed by a parent, including fulfilling parental responsibilities
toward the child, recognizing or holding out the child as the indi-
vidual's child, materially participating in the child's upbringing,
and residing with the child in the same household as a regular
member of that household." UPC § 2-115(4).
32 Id. An example in which death would prevent a parent
from functioning as a parent would be if Rick were a soldier who
was deployed to a war zone after Donna became pregnant but was
killed in action before the child was born.
* See UPC § 2-120(h)(1).
' Federal law provides that an unmarried man can be listed as
the child's father on a birth certificate only if there is a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity by both the mother and father or
paternity is adjudicated by a court or an administrative agency of
competent jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(i). Michigan
law implements this federal provision by providing: "If the child's
mother was not married at the time of conception or birth, the name
of the father shall not be entered on the certificate of birth without
the written consent of the mother and without the completion, and
filing with the state registrar, of an acknowledgment of parentage
by the mother and the individual to be named as the father." MICH.
COMP. L. ANN. § 333.2824(2).
" See UPC § 2-120(f). For discussion of how consent is man-
ifested, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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child relationship between Ann and the child could
be established if Ann consented to Sara's assisted
reproduction with the intent to be treated as the
child's other parent. Her consent could be evi-
denced by a writing or, absent a writing, if she
functioned as the child's parent within two years of
the child's birth. 6
Betty, an Unpartnered Woman
Suppose that Betty is an unpartnered woman who
desires to have a child by assisted reproduction using
the sperm of a third-party sperm donor or the egg of a
third-party egg donor. For inheritance and class-gift
purposes, Betty would be the child's only parent.
Posthumous Conception
The principal question in the case of posthumous
conception is whether the decedent has a parent-child
relationship with the child so that the child is treated as
the decedent's child for purposes of intestacy or class
gifts. If, in the above cases, Donna, Mary, or Sara
became pregnant after the death of Rick, Sam, or Ann,
a parent-child relationship clearly exists between
Donna, Mary, or Sara and the resulting child." The
question is whether the decedent, Rick, Sam, or Ann,
also has a parent-child relationship with the child. The
answer is yes if Rick, Sam, or Ann consented to be
treated as the child's other parent. Ideally, Rick's,
Sam's, or Ann's consent to be treated as the child's
other parent will be evidenced by a writing or other
record. In the absence of such a record, his or her con-
sent can be shown by evidence that he or she intended
to function as the child's other parent but was prevent-
ed from doing so by his or her death" or intended to be
treated as the child's other parent in the case of posthu-
mous conception if that intent is established by clear
and convincing evidence." Because Rick and Donna
were married to each other, there is a strong but rebut-
table presumption that Rick did so intend,40 but there is
no such presumption regarding Sam or Ann.
Surrogacy
Surrogate Nancy
Surrogacy is another option for Rick and Donna,
Sam and Mary, Ann and Sara, and Betty in the previ-
ous examples. It is also an option for Bill and Jim,
who are unmarried partners, or for Hank, an unpart-
nered male. Let's say that they, she, or he enters into a
surrogacy agreement with Nancy, obligating Nancy to
get pregnant by assisted reproduction and then turn
over the child upon or shortly after birth to them, her,
or him as the intended parents or parent.
As surrogate, Nancy never intended to have, and
under the Code does not have, a parent-child relation-
ship with the child.41 The intent of the agreement was
that the intended parents or parent would raise the child
as their, her, or his own. Merely entering into a surroga-
cy agreement does not, by itself, establish a parent-child
relationship between the intended parents or parent and
child, however. The parent-child relationship could be
established by a court order designating the intended
parents or parent as the parents or parent of the child42 or,
absent a court order, evidence that the intended parents
or parent carried out their, her, or his obligation by func-
36 In a child-custody case, the Supreme Court of Vermont
applied a similar analysis. Lisa was the birth mother and Janet was
Lisa's civil-union partner. The court held that Janet was also a par-
ent of the child, saying: "Many factors are present here that support
a conclusion that Janet is a parent, including, first and foremost,
that Janet and Lisa were in a valid legal union at the time of the
child's birth. The other factors include the following. It was the
expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that Janet would be
[the child]'s parent. Janet participated in the decision that Lisa
would be artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated
actively in the prenatal care and birth. Both Lisa and Janet treated
Janet as [the child]'s parent during the time they resided together,
and Lisa identified Janet as a parent of [the child] in the dissolution
petition. Finally, there is no other claimant to the status of parent,
and, as a result, a negative decision would leave [the child] with
only one parent. The sperm donor was anonymous and is making
no claim to be [the child]'s parent.... This is not a close case....
Because so many factors are present in this case that allow us to
hold that the nonbiologically-related partner is the child's parent,
we need not address which factors may be dispositive on the issue
in a closer case. We do note that, in accordance with the common
law, the couple's legal union at the time of the child's birth is
extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage." Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, supra note 1, at 970-71.
" See supra note 22.
" See UPC § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
' See UPC § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
4 See UPC § 2-120(h)(2).
41 The Code does recognize two exceptions to this rule, nei-
ther of which is likely to arise. One is a case in which a court order
designates Nancy as a parent of the child. The other is a case in
which Nancy is the child's genetic mother and no one else has a
parent-child relationship with the child under the Code. See UPC
§ 2-121(c). The practice in which the surrogate is both the gesta-
tional and genetic mother is disfavored in the Assisted Reproduc-
tion Technology community, because the surrogate's genetic link
to the child too often creates additional emotional and psycho-
logical problems in enforcing a surrogacy agreement. See the
Comment to UPC § 2-121.
4 See UPC § 2-121(b).
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tioning as the child's parents or parent 3 no later than two
years after the child's birth." If either of these require-
ments is satisfied, the intended parents or parent have a
parent-child relationship with the child.
Perhaps the most important feature of the Code is
that the enforceability or legality of the surrogacy
agreement is irrelevant to the existence of a parent-
child relationship.45 Voluntary performance of an ille-
gal or unenforceable contract still produces a child who
is entitled to be treated as someone's child. Because
the Code only deals with intestacy and class gifts, the
question cannot arise under the Code unless a child is
actually born. The only question is who has a parent-
child relationship with the child. Disregarding the
enforceability or legality of the surrogacy agreement
has the added advantage of avoiding conflict of laws
questions that might otherwise arise because of the
mobility of society. For example, a child might be born
as a result of a surrogacy agreement that was valid
under the law applicable when the contract was entered
into but the intended parents or parent moved and later
died in a state in which surrogacy contracts are illegal
(or vice versa). It would be cruel indeed for the law to
hold that a child who grew up in the household of the
intended parents or parent is not a child of the intended
parents or parent simply because the surrogacy con-
tract was illegal-and the Code does not do so.
Posthumous Conception
Suppose that Nancy becomes pregnant under a sur-
rogacy agreement that was entered into by a decedent's
surviving spouse or partner. Can the decedent ever
have a parent-child relationship with the child so that
the child is treated as the decedent's child for purposes
of intestacy or class gifts? Under the Code, the answer
is yes under very limited circumstances. Suppose that
Rick died survived by Donna or that Donna died sur-
vived by Rick. Or that Sam died survived by Mary or
that Mary died survived by Sam. Or that Ann died sur-
vived by Sara or that Sara died survived by Ann. Or
that Bill died survived by Jim or that Jim died survived
by Bill. If there is a court order naming the decedent as
a parent of the child, that ends the matter. The court
order controls.' In the absence of a court order, the
decedent might still be treated as the child's parent, but
the first requirement is that the child must have a genet-
ic -connection to the decedent, i.e., the decedent's
sperm or egg must be the source of the surrogate's
pregnancy. In addition, the decedent must have intend-
ed to be treated as a parent of the child. Ideally, the
decedent's intent will be expressed in a record signed
by the decedent which, considering all the facts and
circumstances, evidences the decedent's intent.47 In the
absence of such a record, the decedent's intent can be
shown by other facts and circumstances establishing
the decedent's intent, but that intent must be shown by
evidence that is both clear and convincing.48
In the case of Rick and Donna, there is another
provision that might apply in the absence of a court
order or a signed record indicating the decedent's
intent. If, before death, a married decedent deposited
the sperm or eggs that were used to conceive the child,
the decedent is deemed to have intended to be treated
as the parent of the child as long as the decedent's sur-
viving spouse functioned as a parent of the child no
later than two years after the child's birth.49
Class-Closing Rules
In order to take under a class gift, it is not enough
that the child qualifies as a class member. The child
must also qualify under the class-closing rules, i.e., the
child must be in being or be treated as in being on or
43 For the meaning of the phrase "functioned as a parent of the
child," see supra note 31.
" See UPC § 2-121(d). The Code also anticipates the possi-
bility that an intended parent will die while the surrogate is preg-
nant, making it impossible for the deceased intended parent to
function as a parent of the child. In such a case, the deceased
intended parent has a parent-child relationship with the child if (1)
there were two intended parents and the other intended parent func-
tioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the
child's birth; (2) there were two intended parents, the other intend-
ed parent also died while the gestational carrier was pregnant, and
a relative of either deceased intended parent or the spouse or sur-
viving spouse of a relative of either deceased intended parent func-
tioned as a parent of the child no later than two years after the
child's birth; or (3) there was no other intended parent and a rela-
tive of or the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of the
deceased intended parent functioned as a parent of the child no
later than two years after the child's birth.
1 See UPC § 2-121(a)(1). Surrogacy agreements are illegal
in some states. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 722.855, which
provides: "A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforce-
able as contrary to public policy." The UPC does not seek to over-
turn or interfere with such laws. The Code specifically provides
that the Code "does not affect law of this state...regarding the
enforceability or validity of a [surrogacy] agreement." UPC § 2-
12 1(i). The Code only seeks to deal with parentage for purposes of
intestacy and class gifts when a child is born as a result of a surro-
gacy agreement.
4 See UPC § 2-121(b).
See UPC § 2-121(e)(1).
4 See UPC § 2-121(e)(2).
49 See UPC § 2-121(f), (g).
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before the distribution date."o In cases in which the
distribution date is the deceased parent's death, the
Code deviates from the ordinary class-closing rules by
treating a child conceived posthumously by assisted
reproduction as in being at the decedent's death if the
child was in utero within thirty-six months or born
within forty-five months after the decedent's death.'
This period is intended to strike a balance between two
interests-the interest in the final settlement of trusts
and estates within a reasonable time and the humane
interest in allowing the surviving spouse or domestic
partner time to grieve before making a decision
whether to go forward with an assisted-reproduction
procedure,52 taking account of the fact that the first
attempt to become pregnant and carry the child to term
is not always successful." To illustrate, take the case
of Rick and Donna. Let's say that Rick was diagnosed
with leukemia and was told that he would have to
undergo chemotherapy. Because the chemotherapy
would substantially decrease his sperm count, he first
deposited sperm in a fertility clinic. When he did so,
he signed a record that, considering all the facts and
circumstances, expressed an intent to be treated as a
parent of the child should Donna use the sperm to get
pregnant. Unfortunately, Rick died several months
later. His widow Donna decided to use his frozen
sperm to have his child. Suppose that, several years
before Rick's death, Rick's mother passed away, leav-
ing a will that created a testamentary trust. The terms
of the trust directed the trustee to pay the income to
Rick for life, then to distribute the trust principal by
representation to Rick's descendants who survive
Rick. Donna became pregnant and gave birth to X
forty-two months after Rick's death. Because X was
born within forty-five months after Rick's death, X is
included in the class gift to Rick's descendants created
in his mother's trust.
In cases in which the distribution date arises after
the deceased parent's death, no deviation from the ordi-
nary class-closing rules is necessary. A child conceived
posthumously by assisted reproduction is in being on
the date when the child is in utero, just as is any other
child." To illustrate, take the case of Sam and Mary.
Like Rick in the above case, Sam was diagnosed with
leukemia and was told that he would have to undergo
chemotherapy. Because the chemotherapy would sub-
stantially decrease his sperm count, he first deposited
sperm in a fertility clinic. When he did so, he signed a
record that, considering all the facts and circumstances,
expressed an intent to be treated as a parent of the child
should Mary use the sperm to get pregnant. Unfortu-
nately, Sam died several months later. Suppose that
before Sam's death, he created a revocable inter vivos
trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to Sam for
life, then "to pay the income to my partner, Mary, for
life, then to distribute the trust principal by representa-
tion to my descendants who survive Mary." A year or so
after Sam died, Mary decided to become inseminated
with Sam's frozen sperm so that she could have his
child. She became pregnant but unfortunately had a
miscarriage. A second try was successful and she gave
birth to X four years after Sam's death. Mary raised X.
Upon Mary's death many years later, X was a grown
adult. Because X was living on the distribution date
(Mary's death), X is a class member and is therefore
entitled to receive the trust principal."
I For an exposition of the class-closing rules, see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANS-
FERS § 15.1. Section 15.1 provides that, "unless the language or
circumstances establish that the transferor had a different intention,
a class gift that has not yet closed physiologically closes to future
entrants on the distribution date if a beneficiary of the class gift is
then entitled to distribution."
" See UPC § 2-705(g)(2). The same time limit applies for
purposes of intestacy. See UPC § 2-120(k); § 2-121(h). If the
assisted-reproduction procedure is performed in a medical facility,
the date when the child is in utero will ordinarily be evidenced by
medical records. In some cases, however, the procedure is not per-
formed in a medical facility, and so such evidence may be lacking.
Providing an alternative of birth within 45 months is designed to
provide certainty in such cases. The 45-month period is based on
the 36-month period with an additional nine months tacked on to
allow for a typical period of pregnancy.
5 On the grieving process and the different stages of grief, see
ELIZABETH KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969);
Maciejewski, Zhang, Block & Prigerson, An Empirical Examina-
tion of the Stage Theory of Grief, 297 JAMA 716 (2007).
" The 36-month period also coincides with UPC § 3-1006,
under which an heir is allowed to recover property improperly dis-
tributed or its value from any distributee during the later of three
years after the decedent's death or one year after distribution.
Another provision of the Code gives the decedent's personal repre-
sentative authority to take account of the possibility of posthumous
conception in the timing of all or part of the distribution of the
estate. See UPC § 3-703. The Comment to this section is sched-
uled to be amended to refer explicitly to posthumous conception.
Comparable authority is likely to be given trustees by a future
amendment to the Uniform Trust Code. Compare CAL. PROB.
CODE § 249.6.
See UPC § 2-705 Comment.
* A case that reached the same result that would be reached
under the Code is In re Martin B., 841 N.YS.2d 207 (Sur. Ct.
2007). In that case, two children (who were conceived posthu-
mously and were born to a deceased father's widow around three
and five years after his death) were included in class gifts to the
deceased father's "issue" or "descendants." The children would
also be included under the Code because the deceased father signed
a record that evidenced his intent to be treated as the child's father,
the distribution dates arose after the deceased father's death, and
the children were living on the distribution dates.
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Conclusion
As amended, the Uniform Probate Code now rep-
resents a comprehensive statutory approach to the
class-gift and inheritance rights of children born as
the result of assisted reproduction. The Commission-
ers have heard the pleas of the numerous jurists who
have urged a legislative solution to this vexing prob-
lem. We hope that these new provisions will be con-
sidered by bar groups and state legislatures, all of
whom in time will have to address this increasingly
important topic.
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